Abstract. Break the Glass (BTG) is an important feature for authorization infrastructures, as it provides flexible access control in exceptional cases. Current realizations have two drawbacks: They neglect the need to manage authorization steps, and they do not take immediate process context into account. Our approach in turn embeds BTG functionality into business processes (BPs): The steps to perform BTG and the obligations compensating a BTG access for data are parts of the BPs. To support process designers in embedding BTG steps and obligations, we introduce an expressive annotation language for specifying BTG tasks for BP models. In particular, our language allows process designers to take BP context into account and to specify security constraints for role holders performing BTG tasks. Using our approach, one can efficiently specify and use context-aware BTG functionality for BPs.
Introduction
Problem Statement. Security mechanisms are important for Business Process Management (BPM). For instance, authorization constraints specify which roles may perform a task or access certain data. However, such mechanisms sometimes are too rigid, and more flexibility is needed. To illustrate, emergencies (e.g., in Ehealth) and disaster management necessitate rights to access data in exceptional situations. Thus, a trade-off between security on the one hand and flexibility on the other hand needs to be facilitated.
The so-called Break the Glass (BTG) principle provides flexibility by allowing users to overcome access denials in exceptional cases [1] . The designer specifies in advance who, in particular situations, will have access rights he normally does not have. In line with [5] , the prerequisites to "break the glass" from the application perspective are: (1) regular access is denied, (2) BTG access is foreseen for the exceptional case, (3) a user explicitly asks for access, (4) optionally, another user has to agree to this access. We call the sequence of steps when users ask for exceptional access BTG steps in the following. Next, obligations typically are part of BTG, i.e., operations that compensate 1 for the security violations. Obligations can be triggered immediately after breaking the glass (synchronously) or later (asynchronously).
Example 1 (E-Health).
In the regular case, only dedicated persons, such as the family doctor of a patient, are authorized to access health-record data of patients. We assume that this data is stored externally and policies (e.g., sticky policies) specify authorizations for data access. In a life-threatening situation, other members of the medical staff might need access to the data. By Breaking the Glass, physicians who are not authorized in the regular case access the record in a controlled way. An exceptional access results in many obligations, such as auditing the data access, informing the familiy doctor, among others. We exemplarily focus on O1: At the end of the treatment process, the physician has to send a report to the family doctor. Here, the point of time when sending the report depends on the BP context, i.e., when the treatment of the patient has been finished. This obligation is asynchronous because it refers to a later point in time.
We envision integrating BTG functionality into BPMS. This is new and challenging, because existing approaches providing authorization infrastructures for BTG (e.g., [1], [5] , and [9]) do not cover the following aspects: (1) Modelling BTG steps and obligations as part of the BP and executing them. (2) Considering BP-specific features, BP context in particular.
Regarding (1), related work leaves the execution of BTG steps and obligations to the application and views them as black boxes. However, a BTG access typically consists of several steps. The same holds for obligations. This asks for mechanisms to embed BTG steps and obligations into the BP, since the modelling of such steps and their execution is exactly the purpose of BPMSs.
The development of context-aware systems is a challenging research area. Most approaches take environmental context into account. Immediate process context in turn is information that characterizes the process itself. It refers to the execution state of a process instance, such as the state of tasks, associated actors, or objects to be accessed [12] . Regarding (2), combining immediate BP context with BTG functionality has several advantages, as we will explain in Section 2. But existing work does not take immediate BP context for BTG realizations into account.
Goals and Challenges:
Our overall goal is to integrate BTG functionality into the BP and to have it executed by a BPMS. By doing so, we take BP context into account. To accomplish this, this paper focuses on the following goals:
-Facilitating the embedding of BTG steps and obligations into BPs. Without any support for the embedding, process designers have to model both the process logic and the security constraints for BTG functionality by hand. This requires profound security knowledge and thus is error prone; and it is time-consuming. Thus, there should be support at the process-modelling level. By using annotations for process models (e.g., [7] , [11] , and [14]), designers can rely on the modelling primitives they are used to. We develop an annotation language for BP models representing BTG functionality. -Context-aware annotation language. As BP context is important for BTG functionality, the annotation language has to provide support for the coupling of contextual information with BTG tasks.
